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 The Economic Implications of
 Public Disability Insurance in
 the United States
 Patricia M. Danzon, University of Pennsylvania
 A review of previous analyses of labor supply effects of Social Security
 Disability Insurance (DI) concludes that estimates of labor supply
 effects and net social costs are upward biased because they ignore
 interactions between DI and other insurances. A model of optimal
 insurance, postinjury accommodations, and labor supply shows that
 reduction in labor supply and increase in consumption when disabled
 do not necessarily imply moral hazard. Optimal postinjury accom-
 modations vary inversely with firm size. The Americans with Dis-
 abilities Act will reduce wages and labor supply of healthy workers,
 particularly in small firms. Effects on labor supply of the disabled are
 ambiguous.
 I. Introduction
 Estimates of the number of disabled persons in the United States vary
 because disability is not an objective medical condition. Whether or not
 persons with a given medical condition consider themselves disabled and
 withdraw from the labor force depends on psychological, economic, and
 social factors. According to the 1988 Current Population Survey, 8.6% of
 the population aged 16-64 years, or 13.4 million people, were "work dis-
 abled" in 1988.' The percent disabled increases from 3.8% of 16-24-year-
 l Persons are classified as having a work disability if they (1) have a health
 problem or disability that prevents them from working or that limits the kind or
 amount of work they can do; (2) have a service-connected disability or ever retired
 or left a job for health reasons; (3) did not work in the survey reference week or
 previous year because of long-term illness or disability; or (4) are under 65 and are
 covered by Medicare or receive Supplemental Security Income. See U.S. Bureau of
 the Census (March 1989), table 592.
 [Journal of Labor Economics, 1993, vol. 11, no. 1, pt. 2]
 ?) 1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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 Table 1
 Persons with Work Disability, 1988
 Age Total Male Female White Black Hispanic
 16-24 1,285 674 610 963 291 125
 (3.8) (4.1) (3.6) (3.5) (6.1) (3.7)
 25-34 2,414 1,249 1,165 1,874 464 189
 (5.6) (5.9) (5.4) (5.2) (8.8) (5.0)
 35-44 2,455 1,308 1,147 1,957 433 217
 (7.1) (7.7) (6.5) (6.6) (11.7) (8.3)
 45-54 2,443 1,190 1,252 1,852 502 190
 (10.3) (10.3) (10.2) (9.1) (20.1) (12.8)
 55-64 4,825 2,285 2,540 3,898 822 290
 (22.3) (22.4) (22.2) (20.4) (39.6) (25.4)
 Total 13,420 6,706 6,714 10,544 2,512 1,011
 (8.6) (8.7) (8.4) (7.9) (13.7) (8.2)
 Percentage of work
 disabled receiving:
 Social Security income 29.5 31.9 27.2 29.7 30.0 23.4
 Medicaid 21.6 18.1 25.2 17.8 37.0 32.8
 SOURCE.-U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989), table 592.
 NOTE.-OOO omitted. Percent work disabled of total population in parentheses. Covers civilian non-
 institutional population. For definition of work disability, see text. Total includes other races not shown
 separately.
 olds to 22.3% of 55-64-year-olds (table 1). Age-specific disability rates
 are almost twice as great for blacks as for whites.2 Disability is inversely
 related to schooling (Berkowitz and Hill 1986).
 Disability insurance in the United States is provided through a network
 of public and private programs (table 2). The Social Security Disability
 Insurance (DI) program has received the most attention. Disability In-
 surance expenditures increased from $3.1 billion in 1970 to $20.5 billion
 in 1987. However, as table 2 demonstrates, other programs have grown at
 least as rapidly as DI since 1970, and it now accounts for less than 20%
 of total expenditures under public or quasi-public programs. Supplemental
 Security Income (SSI), a means-tested income-support program for the
 aged, blind, and disabled that was established in 1974, paid out $14.8 billion
 by 1987. Cash payments under workers' compensation (WC) have grown
 as rapidly as DI. Even more dramatic is the growth in liability insurance
 premiums, which can be viewed as a form of compulsory third party in-
 surance. Auto liability insurance premiums were almost 2.5 times DI pay-
 ments in 1987. Premiums for other liability, which includes product liability
 2 In 1988 almost 30% of the work disabled received Social Security income.
 There is very little difference between the percent of whites (29.7%) and blacks
 (30.0%) receiving Social Security income, in contrast to the almost twofold difference
 in percent reported work disabled.
 3 The estimates for private insurance are downward biased because data on self-
 insured plans and payments under pension plans are not available.
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 Table 2
 Trends in Expenditures on Disability Insurance Programs in the
 United States (Current $ Billions)
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987
 SSDI* 3.09 8.51 15.52 18.83 20.52
 Supplemental Security
 Income (SSI) 0 5.9 7.9 11.1 14.8
 Workers' Compensation:t 2.0 4.6 9.7 15.1 16.75
 WC total* NA NA 13.56 22.47 25.025
 WC premiums 3.49 6.19 14.24 17.05 23.43
 Liability insurance: 11.10 17.30 31.01 50.40 74.09
 Auto liability# 8.96 13.32 23.32 36.09 49.21
 Other liability** 2.14 3.98 7.69 14.31 24.88
 Private insurances 1.82 2.71 5.34 5.63 6.26
 * U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), tables 577, 568.
 t Cash payments, U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), table 568.
 : Cash and medical payments. Includes payments under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act,
 Defense Bases Compensation Act, and Black Lung. U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), table 590.
 % 1986.
 Premiums written.
 # Excludes auto physical damage.
 ** Includes medical malpractice.
 X Claim payments on short-term and long-term disability income loss policies by insurance companies.
 Group and individual HIAA (1989). For 1970 and 1975, data on individual policies not available.
 and medical malpractice, grew from $2.1 billion in 1970 to $24.9 billion
 in 1987, or 20% more than payments under DI.4
 Previous economic analyses of disability insurance in the United States
 have focused on the effects of DI on labor force participation. One purpose
 of this paper is to point out the limitations of such estimates for drawing
 welfare implications. A second purpose is to analyze the effects of the more
 rapidly growing form of social insurance for the disabled in the United
 States: antidiscrimination legislation that requires access to employment
 and public facilities and services for the disabled. The Rehabilitation Act
 of 1973 prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program
 or activity receiving federal assistance or by the federal government. Section
 503 requires businesses with federal contracts of $2,500 or more to take
 affirmative action to employ and advance qualified handicapped persons
 and to make "a reasonable accommodation to the physical and mental
 limitations of an employee or applicant." Enforcement is through the Office
 of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) of the Department
 of Labor, which can sue the company on behalf of the individual; section
 503 cannot be enforced by private lawsuit, unlike other sections.
 Liability insurance premiums are not strictly comparable to DI benefit payments.
 Liability premiums reflect the discounted present value of expected benefits payable
 on policies written in the calendar year, plus overhead expenses and return on
 capital. The DI benefit payments are on a pay-as-you-go rather than an accrual
 basis and omit overhead costs, including deadweight costs of raising tax revenues.
 Danzon (1992) discusses bias in comparing costs of public and private insurance.
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 The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act vastly expanded the potential
 impact of antidiscrimination legislation. Hailed as the most sweeping civil
 rights legislation since 1964, the act extends the ban on employment dis-
 crimination on the basis of mental or physical disability to all employers
 with 15 or more employees by 1994 and requires access to public buildings,
 telephone services, mass transportation, government, and privately provided
 services such as restaurants, movie theaters, etc. Disability is defined to
 include persons with AIDS or who test HIV positive and those "who may
 be regarded as disabled by others." The act excludes disability related to
 use of illegal drugs. Employers are required to provide "reasonable accom-
 modation" for the disabled, although "undue burden" is a defense against
 the requirement to retrofit existing buildings. In contrast to previous leg-
 islation, individuals may now bring suit on their own behalf.5
 Mandating that employment and public facilities be available to the
 disabled is an extension of publicly mandated disability insurance. To the
 extent that the new legislation simply shifts the costs of accommodations
 from the disabled to others, the effects would be purely distributive. How-
 ever, the analysis below indicates that changing the liability rule is likely
 to impose significant net costs and excess burdens. As a rough estimate, if
 the new legislation imposed a cost of $10,000 on each of the 725,000 private
 establishments with 20 or more employees,6 the cost of accommodations
 to employers alone wouJd be $7.2 billion. Total costs could be much higher
 if the excess burden of distortions in labor supply, costs to providers of
 transportation and other services, litigation, and other overhead costs are
 included.7
 In this paper Section II reviews the structure of the DI program and
 evidence of its effects on postdisability labor supply. Section III evaluates
 the full net economic impact of the DI program incorporating insurance
 and distributive effects. Section IV analyzes the effects of antidiscrimination
 legislation. A theoretical model of optimal levels of disability insurance,
 hours of work, and productivity-enhancing accommodations by employers
 is developed. The model shows that some reduction in labor supply is
 In cases involving a pattern of discrimination, the attorney general can seek
 compensatory (but not punitive) damages and civil penalties of up to $100,000 for
 repeated violations (U.S. Congress 1990, S933, sec. 308).
 6 U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, 1986 data, table 859.
 7Advocates of the disability community argue that "a tremendous percentage
 of people with disabilities really want to work and have the skills to work." Man-
 agement attitude and misconceptions are cited as the major obstacles to employment.
 Several studies have reported minimal additional costs for special training or facilities
 for hiring the disabled (Collignon 1986). However, such studies based on voluntary
 hirings are subject to severe selectivity bias as a basis for estimating the potential
 costs of the new legislation, since voluntary hiring would be most likely to occur
 in precisely those cases where the productivity of the disabled worker is above
 average and costs of accommodation are below average.
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 consistent with optimal (full information) insurance and entails no dead
 weight loss, contrary to the implicit presumption of much of the literature
 on DI. The extent of market failure and likely effects of government-
 mandated accommodations are discussed. The paper concludes that the
 excess burden, per dollar of benefit to the disabled and in total, could be
 considerably greater under antidiscrimination statutes than under the Social
 Security Disability Insurance program.
 II. The Social Security Disability Insurance Program
 A. Program Structure
 The Social Security Disability Insurance Program (DI) is similar in
 structure to the Canadian Disability Insurance program (see Maki, in this
 issue). The DI program was established in 1956 as an amendment to the
 Social Security Old Age and Survivors (OASI) Act and adopted some of
 the characteristics of OASI. Eligibility is not universal but is conditioned
 on having worked a minimum number of quarters in covered employment,
 including immediately prior to disability. The 1965 amendments signifi-
 cantly expanded eligibility under the program by broadening the require-
 ment of "permanent" disability to "expected to last at least one year," and
 by extending benefits to workers under 50.
 Compensation under DI follows the OASI benefit structure. The
 monthly benefit is a piecewise linear function of the worker's average
 indexed monthly earnings (AIME) over years in covered employment.8
 Specific details of the formula, including adjustments for inflation, have
 changed over the years. Since 1983, the use of wage indexing for prior
 earnings, maximum taxable earnings, and for the bendponts in the formula
 imply that real replacement rates (initial benefit relative to average indexed
 monthly earnings) have remained constant. Dependents of beneficiaries
 receive 50% of the insured's benefit, subject to a maximum family benefit.9
 Since 1978, replacement rates, inclusive of other federal, state, and local
 government transfers and workers' compensation, are capped at 80% of
 pretax earnings. Prior to 1978, low wage workers with dependents may
 have exceeded this limit, and enforcement may remain incomplete. Dis-
 ability Insurance beneficiaries become eligible for Medicare after 2 years
 on DI.
 The DI program is financed by a payroll tax of 1.2% on wages up to
 the taxable maximum (1990 rates) for employees in covered employment.
 The number of covered workers has increased over time with the expansion
 8 For 1990, the replacement rate is .9 ($356) + .32 ($2,145 - $356) + .15 (AIME
 - $2,145).
 9 Disabled dependents of covered workers who are not disabled are not entitled
 to benefits unless they have established eligibility by their own work history.
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 of the OASI program. Although the federal government defines the struc-
 ture and financing of the program, it is implemented by state agencies.
 Table 3 shows trends in the number of covered workers, beneficiaries,
 and average benefit levels. The number of disabled workers receiving DI
 benefits increased sharply from 1.5 million in 1970 to 2.86 million in 1980.
 During the 1980s the number of DI worker beneficiaries fell initially, re-
 flecting the tightening of eligibility requirements, but it has drifted up
 slightly since the low of 2.57 million in 1983. Average monthly benefits
 to disabled workers increased from $380 in 1970 to $508 in 1987; however,
 this average reflects the mix of recipients and is not a pure measure of
 changes in worker-specific expected benefits. If Medicare benefits paid to
 DI recipients are added to these cash payment figures, the total (income
 support and medical) is comparable to the $25 billion paid in workers'
 compensation benefits in 1987, and the rate of growth has been similar.
 However, since the number of covered workers potentially eligible for DI
 has increased more rapidly than for WC, the rate of growth of beneficiaries
 per covered worker has been less under DI than under WC.
 Since 1974, the means-tested SSI program has provided income support
 for low-income blind and disabled persons under 65. In principle, SSI
 benefits are coordinated with DI benefits, with a dollar-for-dollar offset
 of DI benefits. Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries are eligible for
 the means-tested public medical program, Medicaid, which would cover
 their medical expenses during the first 2 years on DI and (in most states)
 would cover Medicare's copayments and premium contributions.
 B. Evidence on Labor-Supply Effects of DI
 From 1959 to 1980, the labor force participation rate of males aged 45-
 59 fell from 96% to 88.5%. This parallels an expansion of number of covered
 Table 3
 Trends in Social Security Disability Insurance Recipients (Millions)
 Disabled/Covered Average
 Insured Disabled Disabled Workers Workers (%) Monthly
 Workers* Workerst and Dependents (3 . 1) Benefit
 1965 53.3 .99 1.74 1.95 ...
 1970 72.4 1.49 2.66 2.06 380
 1975 83.3 2.49 4.35 2.99 470
 1980 98.0 2.86 4.68 2.92 496
 1985 109.2 2.66 3.91 2.43 511
 1987 113.3 2.79 4.05 2.46 508
 SOURCES.-U.S. Bureau of the Census (March 1989), tables 572, 575, 578, 579, 176; HIAA (1989), Source
 Book of Health Insurance Data.
 * Insured for disability.
 t Disabled workers under age 65.
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 Table 4
 Labor Supply Effects of Social Security Disability on Males
 Sample Sample
 Study Data Set Size Analyzed Results
 Parsons (1980a) National 3,219 Age 48-62 years Elasticity of




 Wolfe (1984b) Panel Study of 741 Age 45-62 years Elasticity of
 Income in 1978 labor force
 Dynamics nonparticipation
 .06-.21
 Slade (1984) Longitudinal 5,403 Age 58-63 years Elasticity of
 Retirement in 1969 labor force
 History nonparticipation
 Survey .81
 Leonard (1979) Social Security 1,685 Age 45-54 years Elasticity of
 Survey of in 1972 beneficiary status
 Health and .35
 Work
 Conditions
 SOURCE.-Reproduced from Leonard (1986).
 workers and increase in real benefit levels under DI and probably more
 lenient application of eligibility criteria. From 1968 to 1978 the number
 of DI recipients grew at a rate of 7% a year.'0 Several studies have attempted
 to measure contribution of DI to this decline in labor force participation
 of prime-aged males (e.g., Parsons 1980a, 1980b, 1984b; Haveman and
 Wolfe 1984a, 1984b; Leonard 1979). Since reviews of this literature already
 exist (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; Leonard 1986), this review
 focuses on the main issues and findings, for purposes of comparison with
 Canada.
 While the consensus is that DI benefit levels and screening criteria affect
 the number of DI recipients directly and labor force nonparticipation
 (LFNP) indirectly, the magnitude of the effect remains uncertain, despite
 numerous studies. Table 4 summarizes some of the main results. Estimates
 of elasticity of LFNP with respect to benefit levels range from 0.06 to 0.81
 and higher.
 1. Methodological Issues
 The range in estimates of effects of DI reflects differences in sample
 (cohort effects), type of data (time series, cross-sectional, and longitudinal
 10 From 1957 to 1978 the wage replacement rate under DI increased from 30%
 to 41 % for the average nonsupervisory manufacturing worker with no dependents,
 and from 57% to 68% for the same worker with a wife and child (Haveman and
 Wolfe 1984b).
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 panel), and methodologies used. None of the estimates is conclusive, largely
 because of intrinsic data limitations.
 The underlying model is usually a one-period model in which the work-
 er's decision to withdraw from the labor force depends on expected utility
 or income under the two alternatives:
 LFNP =f(Wd,B,X),
 where Wd = expected income if in the labor force, B = expected income
 if out of the labor force, including DI benefits, and X = a vector of other
 individual characteristics.
 Life-cycle effects.-This one-period model ignores the life-cycle impli-
 cations of labor force withdrawal, including depreciation of human capital
 and signaling effects. Asset accumulation may also be affected because of
 pension accrual. If these life-cycle losses are higher for high wage workers,
 estimated effects of DI are likely to be upward biased since DI replacement
 rates are inversely related to income."
 Cohort effects.-If DI were actuarially fair, its effect on labor supply
 would derive solely from the change in the relative price of leisure in the
 two states, healthy or disabled. There would be no life-cycle income effect.
 In fact, because DI benefits are financed from taxes on current workers,
 the first cohorts that became eligible for benefits received a massive net
 windfall. For later cohorts, the net income effect is positive only for low
 wage workers, because of proportional tax financing but declining marginal
 replacement rates. Thus, other things equal, larger elasticities of nonpar-
 ticipation with respect to DI benefits are expected for early cohorts and
 low wage workers. The estimates in table 4 are consistent with a decline
 in the estimated elasticities of nonparticipation for more recent cohorts.
 Unobservable wages and benefits. -A fundamental problem in estimating
 labor force participation (LFP) effects of DI is that Wd is not observed
 for labor force nonparticipants and B not observed for labor force partic-
 ipants and nonparticipants who either do not apply or are rejected. Different
 studies have used different techniques to address this problem, but even
 with the best possible methods applied to the available data, the resulting
 estimates may nevertheless be biased, for reasons discussed below.
 Identification of wage and benefit effects.-The variable B is a piecewise
 linear function of average monthly earnings while working, with a declining
 marginal replacement rate, 12 and most workers are on the last two segments.
 Thus differences in the relationship between B and predisability wage Wa
 " Sickles and Taubman (1986) include forgone OASI benefits in their analysis
 of health and retirement decisions of the elderly but do not distinguish effects of
 DI.
 12 See n. 8 above.
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 arise only as a result of differences in wage history over the working years,
 dependent benefits, and truncation by the minimum and maximum family
 benefit. Studies that use Wa as an instrument for Wd and impute B from
 the benefit structure and Wa, rather than the individual's lifetime work
 history and family status, cannot distinguish the effects of low Wd from
 the effect of a relatively high replacement rate B/Wd. If the analyst's proxy
 for Wd is more upward biased for low wage workers-for example, because
 disability reduces productivity more in jobs requiring physical strength-
 then the measurement error in the predicted wage Wd is positively cor-
 related with B/Wd and the coefficient is likely to be upward biased.
 Controlfor health status. -Imperfect control for the effects of disability
 on nonmarket productivity and real full income may lead to biased estimates
 of the effects of B.
 In empirical work, measures of health status are implicitly proxies for
 nonmarket productivity. Results are sensitive to the health measures used.
 A widely used dummy variable for individuals who report that disability
 limits their ability to work is arguably endogenous. Lambrinos (1980)
 shows that including a more comprehensive vector of health status indi-
 cators or partitioning the sample into healthy and unhealthy individuals
 leads to higher estimates of the hours substitution elasticity of the disabled,
 but results are very sensitive to the specification. He attributes the higher
 hours elasticity of the disabled to the fact that they normally work shorter
 hours: in his sample, mean hours of work for the disabled is 894 hours,
 compared to 1,804 hours for the healthy.
 If response to DI varies systematically with health status, then specifi-
 cations that fail to control for attrition of the most disabled from the labor
 force may further bias estimates.13
 Asset substitution. -The fact that private long-term disability (LTD) and
 private pension coverages are typically written as supplemental policies to
 Social Security and other public income transfers is direct evidence that
 private and public insurance are substitutes. Indeed, the low rates of LTD
 and private pension coverage for low wage workers are probably attrib-
 utable to the fact that DI and OASI provide replacement rates for such
 workers at least equal to the maximum offered by private insurers (.60).
 To the extent that DI has simply replaced private insurance, long-run
 effects of DI on LFNP are overestimated. Most studies ignore private assets;
 those that have included a private asset measure (e.g., Haveman and Wolfe
 1984b) do not model its endogeneity. Since the displacement of private
 assets is positively correlated with the DI replacement ratio B/Wd, this is
 likely to bias upward the estimated effect of DI.
 Omitted fringe benefits.-None of the studies controls for the value of
 Medicare if the individual qualifies for DI or the expected value of private
 13 Leonard (1979, 1986) demonstrates the effects of attrition bias.
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 fringe benefits if the individual remains in the labor force. Since low wage
 workers are less likely to receive employer-provided health insurance or
 other fringe benefits, the downward bias due to using B/W as a proxy for
 the full replacement rate, including noncash benefits, is greater for low
 wage workers. This will further upward bias the estimated effect of DI
 benefits on LFNP. The extrapolation from cross-section to time-series
 effects may also be biased by omitting fringe benefits, which are an in-
 creasing share of total private compensation in the 1970s.
 Expansion of OASDI coverage.-Since 1957 the under-65 population po-
 tentially eligible for DI has increased, due to expansion of covered em-
 ployment, lowering the age of eligibility and adding dependent benefits.
 Time-series analysis or projections of the effects of DI should distinguish
 an increase in the beneficiary rate from a given pool of eligibles from
 expansion of the pool. Similarly, cross-sectional studies that estimate B
 from the nominal benefit structure, without control for worker-specific
 eligibility, may yield upward-biased estimates of response if low wage
 workers were more likely to be in covered sectors.
 Expansion of Workers' Compensation and SSI.-The low probability of
 being accepted for DI, at least on initial application, implies that labor
 force withdrawal in the hope of qualifying for DI is a risky strategy: DI
 alone has a large deductible of indefinite duration. Once on DI, there is
 an additional 2-year wait for Medicare eligibility. For workers who can
 show that disability is work related, this deductible is covered by workers'
 compensation which pays wage loss and medical expense, with a much
 shorter waiting period (typically 1 month or less) which is retroactively
 restored if the disability lasts more than a certain period. The expansion
 of WC coverage and increase in WC benefit levels in the 1960s and 1970s
 imply a reduction in the downside risk of labor force withdrawal and
 hence an increase in the expected benefits from LFNP. Similar effects are
 implied by the introduction of SSI in 1974, which provides means-tested
 benefits for the disabled and eligibility for Medicaid. In cross-sectional
 analysis, failure to control for WC and SSI would bias upward estimates
 of DI effects, since WC replacement rates and SSI benefits are positively
 correlated with the DI replacement rate.'4
 2. Empirical Estimates
 Parsons (1980a) estimates a cross-sectional labor force participation
 equation for 1969, using a sample of 3,219 men from the National Lon-
 gitudinal Survey who were 45-59 in 1966. Explanatory variables are proxies
 14 In most states, the nominal WC replacement rate is truncated by a minimum
 and a maximum benefit; the maximum benefit implies sharply declining replacement
 rates at higher wage levels and in some states is binding for all workers above the
 average wage.
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 for DI benefits and other welfare benefits, both measured relative to an
 estimated wage; an index of mortality between 1969 and 1976, as a proxy
 for health status; age; and unemployment. Since 1969 wages are not ob-
 served for nonparticipants, Parsons uses 1966 wages as a proxy for 1969
 potential wages and omits persons not in the labor force in 1966. The 1966
 wage is also used to construct an estimate of B, using DI benefit tables.
 Parsons estimates an elasticity of nonparticipation with respect to the
 replacement rate of 0.63. Applying the coefficients from the cross-section
 regression to changes in the dependent variables over time, Parsons con-
 cludes that DI can explain much of the decline in labor force participation
 of 45-54-year-old men between 1950 and 1980, and differences between
 blacks and whites.
 These estimates of the effects of DI are likely to be upward biased for
 reasons already mentioned, several of which are recognized by Parsons.
 First, using Wa when working as a proxy for potential wage when disabled
 Wd is likely to introduce measurement error that is proportionately greater
 for low wage workers and is therefore correlated with B/Wd. Second, by
 the construction of B, all variation in the ratio B/Wd reflects variation in
 the potential wage. The moral hazard effect of high B/Wd cannot be dis-
 tinguished from the effect of low Wd. Third, failure to control for private
 assets, WC, Medicare, and DI eligibility may all induce upward bias. As
 Parsons notes, the elimination of those not in the labor force in 1966, who
 might also be the most severely disabled, may also lead to upward-biased
 estimates of response.
 Some evidence to support the hypothesis that Parsons's estimated elas-
 ticity is upward biased comes from John Bound's (1985) study of a sample
 of nonapplicants from the 1972 Social Security Survey of Disabled and
 Non-Disabled Adults. Using a similar specification applied to the non-
 applicants, whose behavior is unlikely to reflect the influence of DI (unless
 they anticipated applying for DI later), Bound estimates an elasticity of
 0.88, higher than Parsons's 0.63 estimate.
 Haveman and Wolfe (1984b) use a sample of 741 men aged 48-62 from
 the 1978 Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They use a composite
 measure of disability income, which includes DI, SSI, and other public
 transfers and veterans and other disability pensions, which presumably
 includes private pensions. There is no attempt to distinguish net effects of
 DI. They use a three-step estimation procedure, following Lee (1979). The
 first step is a probit equation for labor force participation that does not
 include measures of expected income in and out of the labor force. This
 is used to impute a selectivity correction that is used in the potential earnings
 and disability income equations. At the third step the predicted incomes
 from these equations are included in a probit equation for predicting labor
 force participation. This technique requires the very strong specification
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 and identification assumptions, that some variable affects W and B but not
 labor force participation. 5
 The resulting elasticities for labor force nonparticipation range from .06
 to .21; the lower estimates are obtained when additional controls are added
 for dependent benefits, selectivity, occupation, and other household income.
 The estimated response is extremely nonlinear, with higher elasticities for
 the more disabled and low wage earners. Although the elasticity of labor
 force participation with respect to disability income calculated at sample
 means is very low (between -.0003 and -.0005), their simulations (Have-
 man and Wolfe 1984b, table 5) imply that a 25% increase in expected
 disability income would increase the disability recipiency rate by 1.04 per-
 centage points or an elasticity of 0.55.16
 Slade (1984) analyzes a sample of men aged 58-63 from the 1969 Lon-
 gitudinal Retirement History Survey. Wages for nonparticipants are im-
 puted from a wage equation using a sample selection correction, and an
 earnings history is used to impute DI benefits. He finds an elasticity of
 nonparticipation with respect to DI benefits of .81, and .90 when the sample
 is restricted to those with self-reported health limitations, higher than
 Parsons's (1980a) estimate of .63. Note that this is consistent with the
 hypothesis of a larger income effect for earlier cohorts.17 Again, the esti-
 mates are suspect because of the difficulty of imputing a potential wage
 for the disabled and the intrinsic correlation between high DI replacement
 rates and low potential wages.18
 Leonard (1979) uses a sample of 1,685 men aged 45-54 from the 1972
 Social Security Survey of Health and Work Characteristics, merged with
 the Social Security earnings history, to estimate the effect of expected DI
 benefit levels on the probability of DI recipiency. The structural model is
 SSDK = F(SSD, W, X) + e,
 W = Zb + u,
 15 As Leonard (1986) points out, application of a Heckman selectivity correction
 is more complex in this context because it requires estimating the probability of
 observing a positive wage, which is closely related to estimating the probability of
 not being a DI recipient, which is what is ultimately to be measured.
 16 See Bound (1985) and Leonard (1986) for discussion on this. Note that elas-
 ticities of LFNP with respect to benefit levels may differ from elasticities of reci-
 piency rates.
 1 Optimal investment in human capital would also predict larger effects for
 older age groups. In order to distinguish pure age (human capital) from cohort
 (income) effects it would be necessary to compare age-specific elasticities for dif-
 ferent cohorts.
 l Use of actual earnings history does not necessarily reduce the correlation because
 earnings history reflects both actual wages while working and intermittent pre-
 application labor force participation, which may indicate poor health and low
 potential wage once disabled.
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 and
 p = Hg1 + Xg2 + m,
 where
 SSDK = probability of being a DI recipient,
 SSD = expected DI benefits = p X B,
 W = expected labor market income,
 p = probability of eligibility,
 H = health status,
 X, Z = vectors of individual background characteristics, and
 e, u, m = error terms.
 Leonard forgoes identification of the coefficient of W in the beneficiary
 equation, using indirect least squares:
 SSDK = F(SSD, Zb + u, X) + e.
 Expected DI benefits (SSD) are estimated as the product of de jure benefits
 if eligible (based on actual earnings record and number of dependents)
 and the probability of eligibility which is estimated from the third equation
 using a sample of recent applicants. As Leonard (1986) points out, the
 coefficient on this variable may be upward biased if errors in the eligibility
 and beneficiary equations are positively correlated. Health status is mea-
 sured by a set of 27 dummy variables for specific health conditions.
 Leonard estimates that a $180 increase in annual benefits will increase
 the proportion of DI beneficiaries in the population by one percentage
 point, or an elasticity of 0.35. The probability of being a beneficiary is
 negatively related to education and to having predisability wages above
 the ceiling. He attributes this to greater job opportunities for partially
 disabled white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. He concludes
 that the probability of eligibility is significantly lower for nonwhites.
 However, given the lower expected benefits corresponding to a given level
 of de jure benefits, race has no effect, after controlling for job opportunities
 and poor health. Applying these cross-section estimates to the time-series
 data, Leonard estimates that DI accounts for roughly half of the decline
 in male labor force participation between 1957 and 1975 or 1.8 of the 3.5
 percentage points. Although Leonard's estimates are probably the most
 reliable, given the available data, the potential for upward bias remains,
 given the difficulty of distinguishing net effects of DI and other correlated
 factors.
 If the cross-section evidence is discounted because of problems of dis-
 tinguishing DI effects from those of low wages, what other factors might
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 explain the decrease in LFP, other than the simultaneous increase in number
 of DI beneficiaries? Leonard (1986) rejects arguments based on changes
 in marital status, structural unemployment, weak prior labor force attach-
 ment, veteran status, and increase in wives' labor force participation. Other
 possible contributing factors, which are not explicitly included in these
 studies, are the growth in WC benefit levels and duration of coverage for
 permanent total disabilities, the introduction of SSI and Medicaid, and
 private LTD and pensions benefits. In particular, the sharp increase in DI
 recipiency rates between 1970 and 1975 may have been stimulated by in-
 troduction of SSI and the sharp 1972 increase in DI benefit levels, including
 a flaw in the indexing adjustment which created strong incentives for early
 retirement. Since this error was recognized but not corrected until 1977,
 there would have been an incentive to take advantage of a benefit structure
 that was temporarily higher than might be expected for the long run. The
 transitory effects of these events should be distinguished from the per-
 manent effects of DI.
 More recent experience suggests that screening stringency as well as
 benefit levels contribute to the DI applicancy rate and hence to the declining
 LFP of prime-aged males. Since 1980, the number of DI recipients has
 remained stable or even fallen, despite a modest increase in average monthly
 DI benefit levels (see table 2).i9 The decline in DI recipiency rates in the
 early 1980s partly reflects tightening of the screening process under the
 Reagan administration. Several studies have demonstrated the sensitivity
 of DI applicant rates to the acceptance rate. Marvel (1982) finds that cross-
 state differences in application rates are related to denial rates. Halpern
 and Hausman (1986) confirm that the probability of application is sensitive
 to the denial rate but conclude that "potential applicants seem more sen-
 sitive to the benefit level than to the probability of acceptance." None of
 these studies has attempted to measure the extent to which growth in
 recipiency in the 1970s reflects a looser screening process as opposed to
 increased benefit levels.
 Given the intrinsic difficulties in estimating directly the contribution of
 DI to the decline in labor force participation, other indirect evidence has
 been brought to bear. Several studies have looked at the work history of
 rejected applicants. Treitel (1976) found that 39.7% of male applicants
 who were initially denied benefits in 1967 did not work at all in the sub-
 sequent 4 years, and only 24.1 % worked for 12 or more of the 16 quarters.
 Bound (1985) studied a sample of rejected applicants from the 1972 Survey
 of Disabled and Non-Disabled Adults and the 1978 Survey of Disability
 and Work. He finds that the majority of rejected applicants do not return
 to sustained work. Less than 50% were earning at any given time, with
 19 As noted earlier, the DI benefit structure has remained constant in real terms
 since 1983.
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 yearly earnings for those who worked less than half of the earnings of
 other working men their age. Assuming that rejectees would on average
 be in better health than successful applicants, he concludes that DI accounts
 for at most 1.75% of the 4.25% of men aged 45-54 who were out of the
 labor force, much lower than estimates based on extrapolation from cross-
 sectional analyses. Halpern and Hausman (1986) note that, while 7.7 mil-
 lion adults between ages 20 and 64 report that they were unable to work
 or unable to work regularly, only 26% received DI benefits.20 Of course,
 because the application process is uncertain and the outcome depends on
 demonstrated inability to work, the number of actual DI recipients may
 understate the number whose labor force withdrawal is influenced by the
 potential for DI.2'
 3. Conclusions
 It seems safe to conclude that DI has contributed to the decline in LFP
 of males, but the magnitude of the effect remains uncertain, as does the
 relative importance of the dollar benefits and the stringency of the screening
 process. The failure to resolve this issue reflects inherent limitations of the
 data available, not defects in the analytic methods used. The evidence
 strongly suggests that DI is subject to type I and type II errors-acceptance
 of some who could work and rejection of others who cannot. Even if DI
 does have a significant effect on LFP, measurement of the productivity
 loss should not simply extrapolate from productivity of able-bodied work-
 ers. Both theory and empirical evidence confirm that those most affected
 have relatively low potential wages even prior to disability. Further, the
 disabled who do work report average annual hours and yearly earnings
 that are less than half the annual hours and earnings of the nondisabled.
 Assuming that those who continue to work have higher potential wages
 and hours than those who drop out, this would be an upward-biased es-
 timate of the loss in output due to labor force withdrawal of those on DI.
 III. Net Economic Effects of DI
 Although most prior studies of DI have focused on its effect on labor
 force participation, a full evaluation of the economic impact of DI must
 also consider its effects on insurance, incentives for injury prevention,
 postinjury investments to raise productivity of the disabled, and overhead
 costs including labor supply distortions from the payroll tax levies.22 Mea-
 20 In 1987 30% of the work disabled received some form of Social Security; this
 overstates DI recipiency rates since it includes those 62-64-year-olds who received
 OASI benefits (see table 1).
 21 For example, in 1980 35.7% of successful DI recipients had been rejected on
 their initial application.
 22 In addition, there may be a distortion from substituting pay-as-you-go financed
 DI insurance for funded private insurance. The effects of Social Security on capital
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 surement of the overall welfare effects of DI must also address the prior
 question, Relative to what?
 It is not practical or relevant to compare DI to the first best full infor-
 mation optimum. One possible benchmark is the outcome with no gov-
 ernment intervention and reliance on private insurance markets, uncon-
 strained by government but subject to imperfect information which may
 result in adverse selection, predisability moral hazard (not taking care),
 and postdisability moral hazard (exaggerating disability status). For any
 individual, the net cost of DI (Cdi) is then the difference between expected
 utility under DI and private insurance:23
 Cd = EU[B(DI), t(DI), r(DI), s(DI), h(DI)] - EU[Bp, p, rp, sp, hp],
 where t = DI tax rate, r = prevention expenditures, s = postinjury in-
 vestments, h = hours of work, subscript p denotes optimal values under
 private insurance, conditional on imperfect information, and X denotes
 the private disability insurance premium.
 As already noted, WC and private insurance and pension contracts are
 explicitly written as supplements to DI.24 To the extent that DI simply
 substitutes for equivalent other insurance, there are no net welfare effects,
 and econometric estimates of the labor supply effects of DI that do not
 control for endogeneity of other insurance are upward biased. Although
 these may be unbiased estimates of the effects of disability insurance more
 generally, no welfare loss is necessarily implied, relative to either a full
 information or an information-constrained optimum.25
 In fact DI differs from private insurance in several ways that must be
 considered in a full evaluation. First, the social welfare function may place
 some value on DI's intragenerational redistribution from workers with
 high lifetime earnings to workers with low lifetime earnings.26 Second,
 formation remain an unresolved issue (see, e.g., Feldstein 1974, 1982; Leimer and
 Lesnoy 1982).
 23 A third possible benchmark is the best feasible mixed public-private program,
 given information and administrative cost constraints but ignoring political con-
 straints.
 24 The most plausible explanation for upper limits on duration or dollar benefits
 for permanent total disability, under WC and private LTD policies, is the high
 probability that the individual will have qualified for DI by the time the limit is
 reached.
 25 Measuring relevant private insurance coverage is not easy. Many individuals
 would not know the details of their LTD and private pension coverages. For defined
 contribution plans, asset value is the market value of the individual's contribution
 and is unaffected by the timing of withdrawal from the labor force. But the present
 value of defined benefit plans may be greater, the earlier the withdrawal from the
 labor force.
 26 The redistributional effects of DI are greater than those of OASI, although
 they have identical financing and benefit structures, because high wage workers
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 casual evidence suggests that the risk of adverse selection constrains the
 coverage available in the nongroup market for LTD coverage and raises
 its cost. If private insurance markets are quantity constrained because of
 adverse selection, mandating a minimum level of universal coverage while
 permitting individuals to purchase supplementary coverage can be Pareto
 improving.27
 Another advantage of DI relative to most private LTD coverages is that
 DI benefits are indexed. As long as private insurance markets do not offer
 fair indexed annuities, the utility value of public insurance programs such
 as OASI and DI which do provide indexed annuities exceeds their actuarial
 value Bernheim (1987).28
 On the other hand, some characteristics of DI entail excess burdens
 compared to private insurance. Since DI tax levies do not experience rate
 industries or employers, in contrast to group LTD or WC, DI undermines
 employers' incentives for injury prevention and postinjury rehabilitation
 and distorts relative prices and industrial mix.29 Second, if individuals for
 whom DI is unfair do not value the redistribution, the difference between
 their tax contributions and expected benefits should be viewed as an ef-
 fective tax ,30 with associated tax-induced deadweight costs.
 Third, for low wage workers B(DI) may exceed the optimal level Bp,
 given moral hazard, and public insurance has no information advantage
 over private insurance to control moral hazard. Since 1978, DI benefits
 (including dependents' benefits) combined with workers' compensation
 and other governmental disability benefits cannot exceed 80% of "average
 current earnings," which for most workers is the average monthly earnings
 for the highest year in the 6 years covered employment immediately prior
 to disability.31 However, even if B(DI) is less than full replacement of
 after-tax income plus fringe benefits prior to disability, it may considerably
 exceed potential after-tax earnings after disability, if disability reduces po-
 tential wage rates. This is not necessarily inconsistent with first best in-
 surance under full information (see below), but is more likely to be ex-
 cessive under imperfect information and moral hazard. Although optimal
 disability benefits under imperfect information cannot be determined a
 are less likely to claim disability benefits, whereas they have higher expected duration
 of retiree benefits.
 27 mandatory coverage could be privately or publicly provided.
 28 However, OASI and DI do not necessarily provide the optimal intergenerational
 allocation of nondiversifiable risk.
 29 For an analysis of the industry mix component of deadweight costs induced
 by flat rating in the Swedish social insurance scheme, see Hansson, Lyttkens, and
 Skogh (1984).
 3 See Browning (1985) for estimates of the effective OASI tax rate.
 31 This does not include income from private insurance. Private insurers typically
 set a .60 cap on the replacement rate, including benefits from all sources.
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 priori, the fact that most private insurance coverage sets a cap of two-
 thirds or less suggests that B (DI) for low-income workers exceeds efficient
 levels, given moral hazard. The labor supply effects of this excess coverage
 above information-constrained efficient levels can be considered a net cost
 of DI or a trade-off between efficiency and equity.32
 Finally, applicant screening and periodic review may be less efficient
 under DI than with private insurance. Since applicant screening occurs at
 the state level whereas funding is fully from federal sources, most plausible
 models of bureaucratic decision making would predict a bias toward ex-
 cessive acceptance rates, given the information available. Screeners are likely
 to attach a higher cost to rejection of valid applicants than to acceptance
 of invalid applicants.33
 To get some indication of the net welfare effects of DI, consider a simple
 case where r and s are unaffected by the insurance program. A worker
 faces an exogenous risk of disabilityp that entails a loss of income. Expected
 utility in the absence of insurance is
 EU = ( 1 -p) U(Y a) + pU(Y d).
 With the introduction of DI, the worker pays a proportional tax on labor
 income at rate t. If he becomes disabled, assume that the choice of con-
 tinuing to work and earning income yd is dominated by withdrawal from
 the labor force, receiving benefit B and an increase in leisure. This gives a
 lower bound for the utility value derived from the option of labor force
 withdrawal offered by the DI program. The net change in utility from the
 introduction of DI is:
 (1 p)U(Ya - twaha) +pU(yd + B - k) -(1 p)U(Y a) p U(y d),
 where
 ha = hours of work if healthy,
 wa = wage rate if healthy, and
 k = the reduction in labor income due to withdrawal from the labor
 force, net of the dollar value of the increase in leisure.
 With actuarial insurance, pB = (- p)twh (ignoring discounting). If the
 individual were risk neutral, the net loss is -pk, where k is the earnings
 loss due to postinjury reduction in hours of work, net of the dollar value
 of increased leisure. Econometric estimates of the DI-induced earnings loss
 32 Some studies, e.g., Leonard (1986), implicitly assume that all insurance-induced
 reduction in labor supply is a trade-off between efficiency and equity.
 3 See Mashaw (1988).
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 would overstate the net cost of DI by the value of increased leisure to the
 disabled.
 But for risk-averse individuals, pk overstates the loss in money-equivalent
 expected utility because of the risk premium for insurance protection and
 because the optimal insurance policy may include some reduction in hours
 of work, even under full information (see below). With imperfect infor-
 mation and some moral hazard, optimal benefits Bp would equate, at the
 margin, the utility cost of excessive reduction in h with the utility gain
 from increased protection (Zeckhauser 1970). Thus for workers for whom
 Bdi ' Bp, we can assume that any deadweight costs in the postinjury labor
 market are at least offset by the utility value of risk reduction and increased
 leisure.
 In summary, for workers for whom Bdi < Bp, an upper bound on the
 cost of the DI program is the excess burden induced by the effective payroll
 tax,34 for those for whom DI levies are less than fair, plus any distortions
 in injury prevention and rehabilitation due to lack of firm-specific expe-
 rience rating. For workers for whom Bdi> Bp, there is an additional excess
 burden due to reduction in postinjury labor supply. Against these gross
 costs must be offset any gains from indexed benefits; better protection for
 those who would have been suboptimally insured in a pure private insurance
 market because of adverse selection or myopia; elimination of free riding
 and costs associated with the Samaritan's dilemma;35 and any value assigned
 to the redistributive effects of DI.
 IV. Optimal Disability Insurance, Labor Supply, and the
 Effects of Antidiscrimination Laws
 It is often implicitly assumed that the reduction in labor supply associated
 with disability insurance results from moral hazard and entails an excess
 burden. Contrary to this presumption, the model developed here shows
 that some postdisability reduction in labor supply is consistent with optimal
 (full information) disability insurance. The model also shows the inter-
 dependence between optimal insurance and optimal postinjury investment
 in "accommodations" of the type mandated by the 1990 Americans with
 Disabilities Act (ADA). The likely efficiency and distributive effects of
 the ADA are discussed.
 Assume that a worker faces a probability p of suffering a partially dis-
 abling injury that reduces market productivity. Disability may also reduce
 nonmarket productivity, raising the time and goods required to produce
 consumption commodities, and change the relative marginal utilities of
 work and consumption.
 3 Nominal tax rate minus expected benefits.
 3 I am indebted to Steve Coate for this point.
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 The wage if healthy is wa; if disabled it is wd, with wd < Wa. Postdisability
 wage Wd can be raised by investments (s) with constant unit marginal cost,
 such as readers for the blind or other special equipment, up to a limit given
 by the predisability wage: wed > 0 and wd(s) < w4. If insurance is available,
 assume initially that the insurer can costlessly observe the true state of the
 world, including wd and s, such that the premium is actuarially fair. With
 full information, insurance is payable on the occurrence of disability and
 need not be conditioned on labor force withdrawal. Insurance coverage is
 expressed as a percentage g of the monetary disability-related loss B, which
 includes wage loss and expenses s. The worker chooses hours of work, h a
 and hd, postinjury expenditure on s, and insurance coverage g to maximize
 a Von Neumann Morgenstern concave utility function, which depends
 directly on consumption of composite commodities Z, and indirectly on
 money income Y, nonmarket time L, and the parameters of the production
 function of Z:
 max EU = (1 -p) Ua { Z a[Waha - gpB, La]}
 hahds  (1)
 + pUdZ d{ [Wd(Z)hd - gpB + gB -s Lsd]
 where
 B = waha - wdhd + s.
 The first-order conditions for an interior maximum imply
 UaZaWa - gpWa(UaZ a - UdZd) = UaZa, (2)
 UdZ d Wd + (1 p)gWd(UaZ a U dZ d) = ud Z d (3)
 (wshd - 1)[UdZd + (1 -p)g(UzaZ - UdZd)] = 0, (4)
 and
 UaZ;a = UdZ . (5)
 We are interested in the effect of disability on hours of work and s under
 various possible assumptions.
 A. Wd < Wa, No Aids (s = 0), No Insurance (g = 0)
 Consider first the case where disability lowers market productivity, and
 postinjury aids (s) and insurance are unavailable. The first-order conditions
 for ha and hd imply that the wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
 between income and nonmarket time in each state:
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 wi = Z'IZ' i = a, d.
 The effect of disability on hours of work is theoretically indeterminate.
 Assume initially that nonmarket productivity is unaffected and utility is
 state independent. Without insurance, the reduction in market wage (wd
 < Wa) has both an income and a substitution effect: hd < h a if the substi-
 tution of time for goods in nonmarket production outweighs the income
 effect. But if disability also reduces the productivity of nonmarket time,
 the substitution effect is weakened and if Z 1/Z ' < d/wa, the substitution
 effect operates to increase hd. A decrease in h is more likely if disability
 adds fixed time costs of work (e.g., transportation becomes more difficult),
 raises the marginal disutility of work (work becomes more painful), or if
 discrimination reduces market opportunities.
 B. W. ? 0, Wd(S) < Wa, No Insurance Available
 Now consider the case where investment in s can raise wd, with w d > 0
 Wd(S) < Wa. The first-order condition (eq. [3] but with g = 0) implies
 that the worker makes the income-maximizing postinjury investment in
 aids, even though he bears the full marginal cost and is uninsured:
 w5hd = 1.
 The optimal s * depends not only on w s but also on hd. Comparative statics
 shows that 8s */8wd and 8hbd*/8Wd > 0: workers for whom wd at s = 0 is
 relatively high, will optimally invest more in s, which in turn raises wd*
 and hd*. In this respect s is like any investment in human capital. The
 availability of s makes cross-sectional estimates of labor supply of the dis-
 abled more elastic.
 C. Wd(s) < Wa, Fair Insurance Available
 With fair insurance available, equation (5) implies the standard result,
 that optimal coverage equalizes the marginal utility of money income in
 both states: UzZa = Uz Zy With state-independent utility and no effect
 on nonmarket productivity, this implies g = 1, that is, optimal insurance
 provides full replacement of wage loss and disability-related expenses:
 B= w aha* - wdhd* + s*,
 that is, optimal insurance compensates for earnings reduction due to loss
 of productivity per hour and reduction in hours of work. If disability
 lowers productivity of nonmarket time or goods, optimal insurance exceeds
 full coverage of wage loss and work-related expenses s, that is, g > 1. Of
 course, if insurance is not perfectly experience-rated because the insurer
 cannot observe ex ante the individual-specific probability of disability or
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 control moral hazard ex post, then optimal coverage subject to available
 information g* * is less than g Note that Z' is the inverse of the price
 per unit of Z, wW + xi, where t' and x are the endogenous input of time
 and goods per unit of Z, respectively. If disability reduces market pro-
 ductivity more than nonmarket productivity, Za < Z ', that is, disability
 reduces the price per unit of Z. Then since Uaz = Uz'Z', it follows that
 Ua > Uzd and Zd > Z , that is, total consumption of Z is higher when
 disabled.
 Comparing the first-order conditions for hd and ha, with and without
 fair insurance, shows that hd will be lower if insurance is available. Nec-
 essary conditions for optimal allocation of time, with or without insurance,
 imply that Z d = wdZ d. Since fair insurance reduces Z d, Z d must also fall,
 that is, the availability of fair insurance reduces labor supply when disabled,
 relative to when insurance is not available.
 With fair insurance, the worker makes the income-maximizing invest-
 ment in s (wdhd = 1). This is the standard result, that fair insurance with
 perfect observability does not interfere with loss prevention.
 Two important conclusions follow from this analysis. First, hd * < ha *,
 that is, the availability of insurance is likely to reduce optimal hours of
 work when disabled, even when the insurer has full information (no moral
 hazard) and insurance is actuarially fair. This has important implications
 for interpreting the effects of DI on labor force participation. Despite the
 reduction in hd, expected utility is unambiguously higher when insurance
 is available. Estimates of the excess burden of DI are upward biased if
 based on the assumption that all insurance-induced reduction in hours of
 work by the disabled is nonoptimal.
 Second, if the utility function is state independent and disability does
 not reduce nonmarket productivity, then with fair insurance the worker
 is actually better off when disabled: he has full insurance which equalizes
 monetary income, works shorter hours, and has higher consumption when
 disabled.36 This implies that workers have strong incentives to fake disability
 or even incur minor disability. If disability reduces nonmarket productivity
 or the marginal utility of consumption, then the incentive to incur disability
 is reduced but the incentive to fake is not. Thus the correct measure of the
 excess burden of DI should include only this moral hazard effect, not the
 optimal insurance-induced reduction in labor supply.
 D. The Firm as a Potential Insurer
 Inability of private insurers to observe hd, s, and ws does not undermine
 the feasibility of a first best optimum for insurance and investment in s if
 premiums are individually fair. In that case the cost of decisions with
 respect to hd or s are borne by the worker, and incentives for first best
 36 I am indebted to Gary Becker for emphasizing this point to me.
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 choices are preserved. However, if insurance is not individually fair because
 the insurer lacks perfect information about p ex ante (adverse selection)
 or cannot observe the true state of disability ex post (moral hazard), then
 a first best is not achievable. Controlling ex post moral hazard may be
 particularly problematic because, as shown above, the optimal insurance
 contract provides for a higher level of consumption when disabled, which
 creates incentives to fake or even incur minor disability provided that
 disability does not seriously reduce the productivity of nonmarket time or
 the marginal utility of consumption. If employers can better observe the
 true state of disability, then employer-provided disability insurance through
 long-term contracts may be superior to individually purchased coverage.
 This section therefore analyzes the optimal form of employer-provided
 LTD coverage.37
 Assume that a firm employs N homogeneous workers. Each worker
 faces a probability p of suffering a partially disabling injury. Disability
 reduces market productivity, R, such that Rd < Ra. Assume initially that
 all workers work a fixed number of hours, that is, we abstract from the
 labor force participation and hours of work decisions and from effects of
 disability on nonmarket productivity. Productivity of disabled workers
 can be increased by investment in two types of aid: s is a variable input
 per disabled worker (such as a reader for blind workers) and x is fixed
 input costs that are incurred if any disabled workers are employed but are
 invariant to the number of disabled workers (e.g., providing ramps for
 wheel chairs). The cost per unit of s and x is 1; R(x, s) is assumed to be
 quasi concave, with Rx_ > 0.
 In competitive labor markets, the long-term employment contract offered
 implies a choice of s, x, and wage rates for healthy and disabled workers
 that maximizes the expected utility of the typical worker, subject to an
 overall break-even constraint:
 max EU = (1 - p) U(wa) + pU(wd)
 waWd S X
 + gJ{Na(Ra - Wa) + Nd[Rd(Z, X) - Wd - S] -X
 where Na is the number of healthy workers, Nd is the number of disabled
 workers, and p. is a Lagrange multiplier. With a long-term contract, the
 relative number of healthy and disabled workers Na/Nd will correspond
 to the underlying odds ratio of becoming disabled, (1 - p)/p. First-order
 conditions imply:
 U= U% m, (6)
 37 Control of adverse selection and economies of scale in administration are ad-
 ditional reasons why most LTD coverage is in fact obtained through employment.
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 Rs + Rxs = 1, (7)
 and
 RX + R, = 1 /Nd. (8)
 Equation (6) implies that the firm acts as a mutual insurer and provides
 optimal risk sharing among workers. If disability does not affect the mar-
 ginal utility of income, wages are equal regardless of disability status: Wa
 = wd = z. The common wage rate depends on average productivity, and
 each worker bears a prorata share of the cost of aids, x and s, each set at
 revenue- (and utility-) maximizing levels:
 W= (N-/N)R- + Nd/N(Rd - s)-x/N.
 Not surprisingly, the utility-maximizing investment in the fixed component
 x varies inversely with the number of disabled workers. The common wage
 rate therefore also varies inversely with Nd . One implication is that if firms
 offer long-term contracts, small firms that have disabled workers would
 not be able to compete with larger firms, in the absence of other offsetting
 advantages.
 E. Short-Term Contracts
 If the labor contract does not provide for any guarantee of continued
 employment if the worker becomes disabled, then competitive spot labor
 markets will yield contracts that maximize the utility for each worker type,
 subject to separate break-even constraints:
 W a= R a
 Wgd = Rd - S - x/Nd,
 Rs + Rxs = 1,
 and
 RX + R, = 1/Nd.
 Investment in x and s is still at revenue-maximizing levels, but the full
 incidence of the cost is on disabled workers. Thus spot labor markets
 provide suboptimal insurance against the risk of becoming partially dis-
 abled. A further implication is again that, to the extent that optimal in-
 vestment in productivity-enhancing equipment entails fixed cost, com-
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 petition will lead to specialization, with some firms hiring a relatively large
 number of disabled workers and other firms hiring none. This is an efficient
 distribution of employment of the disabled, in that it maximizes their net
 income, although it may appear to involve "discrimination."38
 F. Hours Variable and Insurance Available
 Since long-term contracts provide better insurance for workers, consider
 now the optimal long-term contract when hours are variable and insurance
 is also available. The firm now chooses w, s, and x to maximize the worker's
 expected utility, subject to the additional constraint that a worker selects
 h to maximize a utility function over income and nonmarket time in each
 state and an overall break-even constraint for the firm. Define R, s, and
 w to represent hourly rates:
 max EU= (1 -p)U[Z(wahaLa)] +pU[Z(Wdhd + B, Ld)],
 wa, d, B,s,x
 subject to
 Na(Ra - wa)ha + Nd[(Rd(s, x)- wd)hd - s - B] - x 0,
 and
 ZyiW= Zi' i=a,d.
 First-order conditions for wi are
 (UZY - X)ht + X(R - wt)h = 0, i = a, d,
 where k is the Lagrange multiplier of the break-even constraint. The optimal
 level of B implies
 which in turn implies that the optimal wage of the disabled is equal to
 their marginal revenue product, Rd(s5, x*) = wd*. Substituting in the
 break-even constraint implies
 w= R [p(s + B) + x]/(1 - p)ha.
 38 In this simple model, efficiency is equivalent to income maximization. If the
 disabled derive disutility from working in firms with a large number of other
 disabled workers, this would constrain the optimal degree of specialization below
 the wealth-maximizing level. However equal distribution of the disabled across all
 firms would be optimal only if the marginal rate of substitution between income
 and "equal employment opportunity" were zero for disabled workers.
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 Thus healthy workers are paid less than their marginal revenue product
 in order to cover the expected costs of insurance and accommodations if
 disabled. But in contrast to the case where hours of work are fixed, the
 optimal contract does not fully insure money income of the disabled if
 hours supplied by the healthy increase with Wa:
 UZ = UZ 1 Ehawa[p(s + B) + x]/(1 -p)wah4}.
 Assuming utility is state independent, y ,> yd and the difference increases
 with p, B*, s*, x*, and Ehawa, the labor supply elasticity of the healthy.
 Thus employer-provided insurance, where the cost is borne by a wage
 offset when healthy, may be less than first best because of the wage offset
 distorts labor supply. In principle, the employer could mitigate this by
 specifying the number of hours required of healthy workers.
 Optimal levels of accommodations, s* and x*, are inversely related to
 hd*; x * is also inversely related to the number of disabled workers (Nd):
 R = 1 /h and Rx = 1 /N dh.
 G. Effects of Laws Requiring Equal Wages and
 "Reasonable Accommodations"
 It has been shown that, when labor supply elasticity is nonzero and
 insurance is available, the optimal long-term contract implies that wage
 rates of the healthy and disabled should differ in order to minimize the
 excess burden of distortions in labor supply, which is borne by workers.
 The disabled are paid their marginal product, conditional on revenue-
 maximizing investments in accommodations which the firm has every in-
 centive to make. The healthy receive a wage that is less than their marginal
 product in order to finance the expected nonwage costs of insurance and
 accommodations in the event of disability.39 When long-term contracts
 are not available, investments in accommodations are still at revenue-max-
 imizing levels, but the incidence of the cost is on disabled workers.
 If antidiscrimination statutes simply require wed = Wag clearly firms would
 be unwilling to hire disabled workers as long as Rd(O, 0) < Ra. Even if
 R d(s*, x*) = Ra and disabled workers were willing to bear the cost of
 accommodations, they would be precluded from doing so by the equal
 wage requirement, unless they could pay for the accommodations in cash.
 " The results of the analysis are similar if there are three states of the world:
 healthy; totally disabled, with insurance B and no work; and partially disabled, in
 which case the worker may be rehired, and nonzero investments in accommodations
 may be optimal.
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 Thus simply mandating equal wages and that employers provide reasonable
 accommodations would reduce employment opportunities for the disabled.
 Not surprisingly, the 1990 ADA also bans discriminatory hiring. The
 effect of the joint requirements of equal wages, reasonable accommodations,
 and nondiscriminatory hiring is that Wa must fall and wd increases. This
 distorts labor supply of both groups. If the government mandates w"d > Wad*
 the optimal level of B is lower: dB*/dwd < 0. If B cannot be reduced-
 for example, because B is set by statute (either DI or workers' compen-
 sation)-then the reduction in w4 and resulting excess burden on workers
 is greater than if B can be reduced.
 The reduction in Wa required to meet the zero profit constraint depends
 also on the interpretation of "reasonable accommodations" by the courts.
 It has been shown that the optimal level of accommodations depends in-
 versely on the average hours of work of the disabled and, for fixed costs,
 on the number of disabled workers. Thus total social costs are minimized
 if large firms specialize in hiring the disabled. Anecdotal evidence is con-
 sistent with this assumption. The firms cited as being exemplary in their
 hiring of disabled workers are all large (e.g., McDonalds). Conversely,
 the National Federation of Independent Business, which represents small
 firms, was more active than representatives of large firms in opposing the
 1990 legislation. If small and large firms are held to similar definitions of
 'reasonable accommodations,' this is equivalent to a tax on labor in small
 firms. The incidence of this tax depends on the mobility of workers and
 other factors in small firms. Further, requiring that all firms accommodate
 the disabled clearly entails higher total social costs than if specialization
 is permitted.
 One of the claimed benefits for the 1990 act is that it will increase
 employment of the disabled and thereby reduce the burden on social in-
 surance and welfare programs. If the law simply imposed requirements
 on employers that increase potential wage rates of the disabled, some in-
 crease in labor supply and employment of the disabled would be expected,
 assuming positive supply elasticities, but with some reduction in labor
 supply of the healthy. But the law also requires that all services and facilities
 be accessible to the disabled. This will increase the productivity of non-
 market time and the real income of the disabled. Unless there is an offsetting
 reduction in benefits paid under social insurance programs, income and
 substitution effects away from market time could reduce labor supply and
 hence increase the burden on social insurance programs.
 Because many of the costs of accommodating the disabled in providing
 services are fixed costs, regardless of the number of disabled actually using
 the services, placing an accommodations requirement on all service pro-
 viders entails an excessively high social cost of achieving a given level of
 real income for the disabled. As in the case of employment, there are large
 potential gains from specializing and large excess burdens from requiring
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 universal and uniform accommodations. Offsetting these costs may be the
 utility value to the disabled of equal access in all activities.40
 It seems likely that many of the disabled would prefer the cash equivalent
 of the social cost of providing universal access. However, the political
 process appears to preclude this potentially more efficient solution. The
 costs of mandating accommodations are hard to measure, and their inci-
 dence is very diffuse; politically, it is hard to favor "discrimination" against
 the disabled. Conversely, raising benefit levels would require explicit ap-
 propriations in federal or state budgets. Providing political favors by man-
 dating costs on the private sector is becoming a familiar pattern in this era
 of tight government budget constraints. But the social costs, in terms of
 excess burden per dollar of benefit to the disabled, may well be much
 higher than under the explicit social insurance programs such as DI
 and SSI.
 V. Conclusions
 Previous studies of disability insurance in the United States have focused
 on the labor supply effects of the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI)
 program. But other forms of social insurance-in particular, tort liability
 and antidiscrimination legislation-are expanding more rapidly and may
 have larger economic effects. Evaluation of the net welfare effect of DI
 should include not only its labor supply effects but also its effects on
 insurance and life-cycle redistribution of income. When all these factors
 are considered, its net welfare cost, relative to the realistic alternative of
 private insurance with imperfect information, may be quite low.
 A model of optimal disability insurance, postinjury accommodations,
 and labor supply shows that reduction in labor supply when disabled is
 consistent with full information insurance and does not necessarily imply
 moral hazard. However because utility may be higher when disabled, dis-
 ability insurance creates incentives for fraudulent claims and excessive re-
 duction in labor supply. If employers have better information than insurers
 about true disability status, then employer-provided disability insurance
 through long-term contracts may be superior to individually purchased
 insurance.
 If long-term employment contracts are enforceable, equal wages for the
 healthy and the disabled are optimal only if labor supply of the healthy is
 totally inelastic. When labor supply elasticity is nonzero, the optimal long-
 term contract pays the disabled their marginal product, conditional on
 40 There may also be external effects; e.g., the value of wheelchair ramps inside
 buildings is greater if the access roads also have ramps. Although these external
 effects are not explicitly modeled, the general point applies that optimal investment
 in accommodations that are public goods or have external effects is lower, the
 lower the frequency of disabled in the population. Universal access requirements
 are unlikely to be optimal.
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 revenue-maximizing investments in accommodations. The healthy are paid
 less than their marginal product in order to finance insurance benefits and
 accommodations for the disabled. The wage differential between healthy
 and disabled workers is increasing in the labor supply elasticity of healthy
 workers, the probability of being disabled, insurance benefits for the dis-
 abled, and the optimal investment in accommodations. If accommodations
 entail fixed costs, regardless of the number of disabled (e.g., wheelchair
 ramps), the optimal investment in accommodations is positively related
 to the number of disabled workers. Some specialization is therefore optimal,
 with employment of the disabled concentrated in larger firms.
 When long-term contracts are not available, investments in accommo-
 dations are still at revenue-maximizing levels, but the incidence of the cost
 is on the disabled. Insurance is suboptimal if insurers cannot perfectly
 monitor disability status, hours of work, and investment in accommoda-
 tions by the disabled.
 Antidiscrimination statutes that require employers to provide accom-
 modations and pay equal wages would reduce employment opportunities
 for the disabled. If discriminatory hiring is also banned, as it is by the
 ADA, the wages of the healthy must fall, which will reduce their labor
 supply. Wages for the disabled increase, but effects on their labor supply
 are ambiguous because real income and the productivity of nonmarket
 time are increased by the mandate that all services and facilities be accessible
 to the disabled.
 Because some accommodations are fixed costs, the ADA's universal ac-
 cess requirements imply a tax rate that varies inversely with size of firm
 or service establishment. The incidence of this tax will be on immobile
 factors in these firms and establishments. If the total social costs and the
 incidence of the costs of this method of expanding insurance for the disabled
 were explicit, it seems unlikely that it would be widely supported. However,
 this conclusion is tentative because the analysis here has not considered
 all possible effects of the ADA. Specific issues that should be addressed in
 future analysis include its effects on discrimination, costs of litigating valid
 and frivolous claims, and consumption and production externalites from
 providing universal access for the disabled.
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